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Abstract 
 
This study investigates linkages between the mobile phone, information sharing offices (ISO) 
and financial sector development in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011. ISO are 
private credit bureaus and public credit registries. The empirical evidence is based on 
contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. Two main hypotheses are tested: 
mobile phones complement ISO to enhance the formal financial sector (Hypothesis 1) and 
mobile phones complement ISO to reduce the informal financial sector (Hypothesis 2). The 
hypotheses are largely confirmed. This research adds to the existing body of literature by 
engaging hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial sector development and investigating the 
role of mobile phones in information sharing for financial sector development. 
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1. Introduction  
 
 The mobile phone is transforming the lives of many by offering not just a means of quick 
communication but also enabling a previously unbanked fraction of the population in developing 
countries to have access to ‘mobile banking’-related services. Information and communication 
technology (ICT) is also being used by information sharing offices (ISO) to enhance financial 
allocation efficiency and financial sector development in the banking industry.  
 The literature on the use of ISOs to enhance financial access has revolved around two 
main themes: the effect of decreasing information asymmetry (IA) and the relevance of 
creditors’ rights in consolidating mechanisms of reducing IA. In essence, one branch of the 
literature has been oriented fundamentally towards the relevance of better creditors’ rights in, 
inter alia: bankruptcy (Claessens & Klapper, 2005; Djankov et al., 2007; Brockman & Unlu, 
2009) and bank risk-taking (Houston et al., 2010; Acharya et al., 2011). Another branch of the 
literature has focused on investigating how enhanced sharing of information by ISO can: affect 
syndicated bank loans (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010); influence corrupt lending (Barth et 
al., 2009) and antitrust intervention (Coccorese, 2012); mitigate the cost of credit (Brown et al., 
2009); boost financial access (Asongu et al., 2016a; Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Brown et al., 2009; 
Djankov et al., 2007) and decrease rates of default (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002).  
 The literature has substantially focused on developed nations and the emerging 
economies of Latin America and Asia, while the corresponding scholarship on Africa is sparse.  
In essence, some studies have focused on nine African countries (see Barth et al., 2009); four 
(Love & Mylenko, 2003) and none (Galindo & Miller, 2001). More recently, Triki and Gajigo 
(2014) assessed 42 countries for the period 2006-2009, whereas Asongu et al. (2016a, 2016b) 
examined 53 countries within the periodic interval of 2004 and 2011.  
 The engaged literature can be improved in four main ways, notably by: (i) focusing on 
African countries; (ii) investigating the complementary role of the mobile phone in information 
sharing to enhance financial sector development; (iii) engaging previously unexplored 
dimensions of financial sector development in the financial development literature and (iv) 
accounting for initial levels of financial sector development. We engage the points substantively 
in the same chronological order. 
 First, both the broad (Houston et al., 2010; Tanjung et al., 2010; Ivashina, 2009;  Galindo 
& Miller, 2001) and African-centric (Asongu et al., 2016b; Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Singh et al., 
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2009; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2018) literature on information sharing has not substantially 
explored the role of reducing information asymmetry (IA) in financial development in Africa. 
The neglect of the IA dimension is not very surprising because data on information sharing were 
only available from 2004.  
In the related literature, Love and Mylenko (2003) have concluded that private registries 
promote bank lending and reduce constraints to financial access while the corresponding effects 
from public credit registries are not very significant. Galindo and Miller (2001) maintain that 
credit registries are better drivers of financial development compared to credit bureaus. Singh et 
al. (2009) find that African countries with information sharing offices are rewarded with higher 
levels of financial access. Triki and Gajigo (2014) conclude that relative to public credit 
registries (PCR), financial access is more positively sensitive to private credit bureaus (PCB)2. 
Asongu et al. (2016b) establish that ISOs have negatively affected financial access for the most 
part, while Asongu et al. (2016a) have found financial development dynamics to be less 
positively sensitive to PCR, compared to PCB. 
This study is closest to the last three inquiries that have recently employed PCB and PCR 
as proxies for information sharing. A common gap in the attendant studies is the failure to 
consider the relevance of information technology in the relationship between information sharing 
and financial access. This study bridges the identified gaps by involving information technology 
in the investigated relationship. The intuition and theoretical underpinnings supporting the 
relevance of information technology are substantiated in Section 2. Moreover, instead of 
focusing on financial access as in the corresponding literature, this research is concerned with 
financial sector development. Furthermore, the positioning of the study is also in response to 
recommendations for more scholarly research on the effects of ISO (Singh et al., 2009, p. 13).  
Second, the motivation for investigating the complementary role of the mobile phone in 
information sharing to enhance financial sector development builds on the high potential for 
mobile phone penetration in information sharing on the continent3. As recently documented by 
Penard et al. (2012), while mobile phone penetration has reached saturation and stabilization 
                                                          
2
 ISO is used interchangeably with ‘PCR and PCB’.  
3
 There is a growing strand of literature on the relevance of ICT in development outcomes in Africa(Afutu-Kotey et 
al., 2017; Asongu & Boateng, 2018; Bongomin et al., 2018 ; Gosavi, 2018; Humbani & Wiese, 2018; Isszhaku et al., 
2018; Minkoua Nzie et al., 2018; Muthinja & Chipeta,  2018; Abor et al., 2018). 
 
 5 
levels in high-end markets (in Europe, North America and Asia), there is still room for its 
development in Africa.  
Third, introducing the notion of financial sector development is motivated by the fact 
that, for the most part, the literature on banking development has been skewed towards bank 
concentration and bank participation (see Asongu, 2015a; O’Toole, 2014). Moreover, as 
documented by Aryeetey (2005), Adeusi et al. (2012) and Meagher (2013), the role of the 
informal financial sector has been neglected in financial development literature, partly because 
studies for the most part have examined the role of financial sector reforms on financial access 
(see  Arestis et al., 2002; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010).   
In the light of the above, by introducing the informal financial sector into the mainstream 
financial system definition, the study unites two branches of research by on the one hand, 
improving the macroeconomic literature on development within the financial sector and on the 
other hand, responding to an evolving branch of development studies on channels of 
microfinance and informal finance. In addition, the proposed approach is a pragmatic means of 
disentangling the impact of information sharing on various financial sectors in an economy. The 
propositions for financial sector development (which are discussed in-depth in Section 2), 
improve the financial development literature in three key areas, notably by: (i) providing a 
financial system definition that incorporates the previously missing informal financial sector; (ii) 
disentangling the mainstream definition of the financial system into its semi-formal and formal 
components and (iii) introducing the concept of financialization within the framework of 
development in the financial sector.  
Fourth, the relevance of a modelling approach that accounts for existing levels of 
financial sector development builds on the intuition that blanket policies on the complementarity 
between mobile phones and ISO in financial sector development may not be effective unless 
such policies are contingent on existing financial sector development levels and tailored 
differently across countries with high, intermediate and low levels of financial sector 
development. Hence, the adopted empirical approach is a quantile regressions estimation 
technique that enables the investigated complementarity to be assessed throughout the 
conditional distributions of financial sector development. The selected approach deviates from 
the existing literature that has been based for the most part on mean levels of financial 
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development, inter alia: Triki and Gajigo (2014) and Asongu et al. (2016b), who respectively 
have employed Probit models and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  
 In light of the above, this research adds to the existing body of literature by engaging 
hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial sector development and investigating the role of 
mobile phones in information sharing for financial sector development. The rest of the study is 
structured as follows. The theoretical underpinnings, propositions and testable hypotheses are 
presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. The empirical results are 
presented in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes with future research directions.  
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings, propositions and testable hypotheses  
2.1 Information sharing offices and financial sector development  
 From a theoretical standpoint, ISOs are expected to mitigate IA between lenders and 
borrowers in the financial industry in order to enhance financial sector development and boost 
financial allocation efficiency. Intuitively, an information and communication technology (ICT), 
like the mobile phone, can be used by ISO to reduce IA. As recently documented (Triki & 
Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016b; Asongu & Biekpe, 2017), over the past twelve years, ISOs 
have been introduced in Africa with the ultimate goal of stimulating banking sector development 
in order to tackle the policy syndrome of surplus liquidity in financial institutions of the 
continent4. Moral hazards and adverse selection in the financial industry can be reduced by 
tackling concerns of financial access that are related to: physical access, and eligibility to bank 
lending and affordability. PCR and PCB can limit the underlying sources of IA with the help of a 
mobile phone.  
 According to Claus and Grimes (2003) and Asongu et al. (2016b), two main theoretical 
views have dominated the nexus between information sharing and financial development. The 
first is focused on the risk features of bank loans whereas the second is oriented towards 
mechanisms by which liquidity provided by banks can be consolidated. The two streams in the 
literature are considered from the perspective that the principal goal of financial institutions is to 
improve the allocation efficiency of mobilised resources which can be consolidated through inter 
alia: increased financial sector development and reduced costs/constraints related to credit access 
(see Jappelli & Pagano, 2002). The role of information sharing in stimulating financial sector 
                                                          
4
 We invite the interested reader to refer to Saxegaard (2006) and Fouda (2009) for more insights into the 
substantially documented concerns of surplus liquidity.  
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development is broadly consistent with the foremost theories, notably: credit rationing models 
with Jaffee and Russell (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Williamson (1986); Diamond 
(1984) on diversification within the financial sector; bank communication to investors on future 
borrowers (Leland & Pyle, 1977) and ex-ante as well as ex-post IA (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983).  
Triki and Gajigo (2014) and Asongu et al. (2016a) also share the same theoretical perspective in 
more contemporary literature.  
 
2.2 The connection between the mobile phone and various financial sectors 
 
The connection between the mobile phone and various financial sectors (formal versus 
informal), can be articulated in three main strands, notably: (i) the usefulness of mobile phone 
transactions in the storing of value, transfer of stored value and conversion of cash; (ii) the 
notions of partial- and basic-integrated savings in mobile banking and (iii) banking in the Global 
system for mobile phones (see Asongu, 2013).  
 First, with the option of mobile banking, users of mobile phones (or mobiles) in 
developing countries can accomplish three principal goals5. (i) Users are endowed with the 
possibility of storing currency. Within this perspective, both the formal and informal banking 
sectors are involved because both real and pseudo bank accounts are used. In essence, whereas a 
real bank account is used when a user has a formal bank account, a pseudo bank account depends 
on the user’s mobile operator. (ii) The mobile phone enables the conversion of cash out-of and 
into the stored value. In addition, when such conversion is associated with a formal bank 
account, users are at liberty to cash-in and cash-out. (iii) The transfer of stored value between 
accounts can be done both formally (with a real bank account) and informally (using the pseudo 
account).  
 Second, according to Demombynes and Thegeya, (2012), two types of mobile savings 
exist. On the one hand, ‘basic savings’ which is typical of the informal financial sector (and does 
not earn interest rate) denotes the use of mobiles for transfers such as in M-PESA (i.e. mobile 
money) for the purpose of storing money. On the other hand, mobile savings that are ‘partially 
integrated’ are connected to the formal banking sector and earn interest rates.  
 Third, in the light of the first two points, the mobile phone is related to both the formal 
and informal financial sectors through the following mechanisms. (i) The mobile can be 
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 ‘Mobile phone’ and ‘mobile’ are used interchangeably.  
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employed to store value because the functions of a smartcard (or virtual bank card) can be 
accomplished by the subscriber identity module (SIM). (ii)The mobile can also play the role of a 
point of sale (POS) terminal by enabling communications and transactions with the relevant 
banking establishment and/or mobile user. (iii) The mobile phone can also be employed to play 
the role of an automated teller machine (ATM).   
 The above theoretical underpinnings have been confirmed by recent empirical literature 
on the connection between mobile phones and financial sector development (see Asongu, 2013). 
The empirical framework builds on propositions that we engage in the section that follows.  
 
2.3 Propositions and testable hypotheses  
 
 The proposed financial sector development variables are based on insufficiencies in the 
International Financial Statistics’ (IFS, 2008) definition of the financial system which has not 
incorporated the informal financial sector (see Asongu, 2014a). Hence, the propositions outlined 
in Table 1 are fundamentally motivated by drawbacks in the IFS’s definition which is restricted 
to the formal and semi-formal financial sectors. Whereas Panel A shows financial sector 
indicators that are based on Gross Domestic Product (GDP), those in Panel B are linked to 
development in the shares of money supply (M2) within the financial sector. In the light of Panel 
B, previously unexplored concepts of financial non-formalization, semi-formalization, 
informalization and formalization are articulated. For example, financial informalization 
represents the improvements in money supply shares of the informal financial sector at the 
expense of the formal and semi-formal financial sectors. The propositions are increasingly being 
employed in the financial sector development literature (Asongu, 2015a, 2015b; Meniago & 
Asongu, 2018; Tchamyou et al., 2019).  
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Table 1: Summary of propositions 
Panel A: GDP-based financial development indicators 
Propositions Name(s) Formula Elucidation 
Proposition  1 Formal  financial 
development  
Bank deposits/GDP Bank deposits6  here refer to demand, time 
and saving deposits in deposit money 
banks. 
Proposition  2 Semi-formal  
financial 
development 
(Financial deposits – 
Bank deposits)/ GDP 
Financial deposits7 are demand, time and 
saving deposits in deposit money banks 
and other financial institutions. 
Proposition  3 Informal  financial 
development 
(Money Supply – 
Financial deposits)/GDP 
 
 
Proposition  4 
Informal and semi-
formal financial 
development  
(Money  Supply –  Bank 
deposits)/GDP 
 
Panel B: Measures of financial sector importance 
Proposition 5 Financial 
intermediary 
formalization 
Bank deposits/ Money 
Supply (M2) 
From ‘informal and semi-formal’ to formal 
financial development (formalization)8 . 
Proposition 6 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization’ 
(Financial deposits - 
Bank deposits)/ Money 
Supply 
From ‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal 
financial development (Semi-
formalization)9. 
Proposition 7 Financial 
intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
(Money Supply – 
Financial deposits)/ 
Money Supply 
From ‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal 
financial development (Informalisation)10. 
Proposition 8 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization and 
informalization’  
(Money Supply – Bank 
Deposits)/Money Supply  
Formal to ‘informal and semi-formal’ 
financial development: (Semi-
formalization and informalization) 11 
N.B: Propositions 5, 6, 7 add up to unity (one); arithmetically spelling-out the underlying assumption of sector 
importance. Hence, when their time series properties are considered in empirical analysis, the evolution of one 
sector is to the detriment of other sectors and vice-versa.  
Source: Asongu (2015a).   
 
 In the light of theoretical evidence that ISO are destined to promote the formal financial 
sector by acting as a disciplining device in discouraging borrowers from resorting to the informal 
                                                          
6
 Lines 24 and 25 of the International Financial Statistics (October 2008).  
7
 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of the International Financial Statistics (2008).  
8
 “Accordingly, in undeveloped countries money supply is not equal to liquid liabilities or bank deposits. While in 
undeveloped countries bank deposits as a ratio of money supply is less than one, in developed countries this ratio is 
almost equal to 1.  This indicator appreciates the degree by which money in circulation is absorbed by the banking 
system.  Here we define ‘financial formalization’ as the propensity of the formal banking system to absorb money in 
circulation” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432). 
9
 “This indicator measures the rate at which the semi-formal financial sector is evolving at the expense of formal 
and informal sectors” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432). 
10
 “This proposition appreciates the degree by which the informal financial sector is developing to the detriment of 
formal and semi-formal sectors” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432).  
11
 “The proposition measures the deterioration of the formal banking sector in the interest of other financial sectors 
(informal and semi-formal). From common sense, propositions 5 and 8 should be almost perfectly antagonistic, 
meaning the former (formal financial development at the cost of other financial sectors) and the latter (formal 
sector deterioration) should almost display a perfectly negative degree of substitution or correlation”  (Asongu, 
2015a, p. 432).  
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banking sector as a viable alternative to the formal banking sector, the following hypotheses are 
tested in this study.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Mobile phones complement ISO to enhance the formal financial sector  
Hypothesis 2: Mobile phones complement ISO to reduce the informal financial sector 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data 
 The study investigates a panel of 53 African nations with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World 
Bank for the period 2004-2011. Of the 54 existing African countries, only South Sudan is 
excluded because data for the country before 2011 is not available.  Information sharing is 
measured with private credit bureaus (PCB) and public credit registries (PCR). These proxies for 
information sharing are only available from the year 2004, whereas the latest date in the FDSD is 
2011. The positioning of the inquiry in Africa is consistent with the stylized facts provided in the 
introduction.  The choice of the ISO variables is in accordance with recent IA literature (see 
Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016a; Tchamyou, 2019a; Boateng et al., 2018; Kusi et al., 
2017; Kusi & Opoku‐  Mensah, 2018; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018). 
 The dependent variables of financial sector development that are proposed in Table 1 are 
computed from the FDSD. Two financial sector variables are used, namely: formal financial 
development (Propositions 1 and 5) and informal financial development (Propositions 3 and 7).  
Semi-formal financial development (Propositions 2 and 6) is not used because of issues in 
degrees of freedom whereas non-formal financial development (Propositions 4 and 8) has a high 
degree of substitution with informal financial development. The mobile phone variable is the 
mobile phone penetration rate per 100 people (Tchamyou, 2017; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2019).  
 Six control variables are employed to account for issues in variable omission bias: foreign 
aid, public investment, trade, gross domestic product (GDP) growth, inflation, income levels and 
legal origins. The choice of these variables is consistent with recent financial development 
literature, notably: Asongu (2014d), Osabuohein and Efobi (2013), Huang (2005), Tchamyou 
and Asongu (2017a) and Tchamyou (2019b). In what follows, we discuss expected signs. 
 Whereas development assistance is theoretically expected to boost financial development 
because its purpose is to mitigate the savings-investment gap poor countries are confronted with 
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(Easterly, 2005), from a practical angle however, foreign aid may also negatively affect financial 
development if, inter alia,  a great bulk of the disbursed foreign aid is: (i) withheld in donor 
countries and/or siphoned by corrupt officials and (ii) deposited in tax havens that fall within the 
jurisdictions of developed countries. There is an abundant supply of literature on the positive 
relationship between economic growth, economic development and financial development (see 
Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1992; Saint-Paul, 1992; Levine, 1997; Jaffee & Levonian 2001; 
Odhiambo, 2010, 2013, 2014; Wale & Makina, 2017;  Daniel, 2017; Chikalipah, 2017; Bocher et 
al., 2017;  Osah & Kyobe, 2017; Boadi et al., 2017; Oben & Sakyi, 2017; Ofori-Sasu et al., 
2017; Iyke & Odhiambo, 2017; Chapoto & Aboagye, 2017). As recently documented by Huang 
(2011), the positive nexus is traceable to, inter alia: greater competition development within the 
financial sector and consolidated availability of financial resources for investment purposes. 
Both empirical (Boyd et al., 2001) and theoretical (Huybens & Smith, 1999) literature are 
consistent with the narrative that chaotic/high inflation is linked to less active and inefficient 
financial institutions. According to Do and Levchenko (2004) and Huang and Temple (2005), 
countries with higher levels of trade openness enjoy better levels of financial development.  
From empirical and theoretical perspectives, countries with traditions of Common law are 
associated with higher levels of financial development when compared to their counterparts with 
French Civil law traditions (2012a). This edge by English Common law is theoretically due to 
better adaptability and political channels (see Beck et al., 2003). Classification of countries in 
terms of legal traditions is from La Porta et al. (2008, p. 289). African countries with higher 
income status have been established to enjoy relatively higher levels of financial development 
(Asongu, 2012b). This expectation is consistent with Jaffee and Levonian (2001), who maintain 
that high income status is associated with more efficient banking system structures. The 
categorisation of nations by income levels is consistent with Asongu (2014c, p. 364)12 on the 
World Bank classification. It is relevant to take note of the fact that the control variables may 
affect the informal and formal financial sectors differently.  
 The definitions of variables (with corresponding sources), summary statistics and 
correlation matrix are respectively presented in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3. It is 
apparent from the summary statistics that variables are comparable, based on mean observations. 
                                                          
12
 There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle income, 
$3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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From the corresponding standard deviations, we can be confident that reasonable estimated 
linkages will emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix is to control for multicollinearity. 
From a preliminary assessment, the concerns about multicollinearity are apparent in the variables 
of financial sector development. Fortunately, these concerns are not issues to worry about, 
because the underlying variables are exclusively employed as dependent variables in distinct 
specifications. 
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
 In accordance with the motivation of this research, in order to account for initial levels in 
the examination of the complementarity between ISO and mobile phones in financial sector 
development, we employ an estimation technique that enables us to assess the linkages 
throughout the conditional distributions of financial sector development. The quantile regression 
(QR) approach is a strategy that enables us to articulate countries with low, intermediate and 
high levels of financial sector development. The relevance of this technique in accounting for 
existing levels of the dependent variable is in accordance with recent development literature (see 
Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017; Asongu et al., 2018). 
 By adopting the QR estimation technique, this research departs from existing literature 
which has investigated the relationship between ISO and financial development using estimation 
techniques that are based on the conditional mean of financial development  (see Asongu et al., 
2016b; Triki & Gajigo, 2014). While mean effects are important, this study extends the literature 
by employing an estimation technique that accounts for initial levels in the dependent variable. 
The policy relevance of the approach is based on the intuition that mean values provide blanket 
policy recommendations that could be inefficient unless such policies are contingent on initial 
levels of financial sector development and tailored differently across countries with low, 
intermediate and high initial levels of financial sector development.  
 Moreover, estimation techniques based on mean values like Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) build on a hypothesis that errors are normally distributed. This assumption of normally 
distributed error terms is not a requirement for the QR strategy (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017b).   
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The  th quantile estimator of a financial sector development variable is obtained by 
solving for the optimization problem in Eq. (1), which is disclosed without subscripts for ease of 
presentation and simplicity.  
    

  
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 
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i
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k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
::
)1(min
,                                               (1) 
where  1,0 . Contrary to OLS which is based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, 
with QR, it is the weighted sum of absolute deviations that is minimised. For instance the 10th or 
90th quantiles (with  =0.10 or 0.90 respectively) by approximately weighing the residuals. The 
conditional quantile of a financial sector development variable or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(   ,                                                                                                        (2) 
where unique slope parameters are estimated for each  th specific quantile. This formulation is 
analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope in which parameters are assessed only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of financial sector development. For the model in Eq. (2), 
the dependent variable iy  is a financial sector development variable, whereas ix  contains: a 
constant term, ISO, Mobile, ISO×Mobile, foreign aid, GDP growth,  trade, inflation, public 
investment, middle income and Common law.  The specifications are tailored to control for 
simultaneity with non-contemporary specifications and the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of 
fixed effects. Consistent with Brambor et al. (2006) on the pitfalls surrounding interactive 
regressions: (i) all constitutive variables are included in the specifications, and (ii) the impact of 
the modifying mobile phone variable is interpreted as a conditional marginal impact.  To 
ascertain that the empirical analysis is not affected by spurious findings because of issues of 
“non-stationarity”, as shown in Appendix 4, unit root tests are performed to establish that the 
variables are stationary13. In the study, robustness is performed by using: (i) different 
propositions of financial sector development; (ii) both contemporary and non-contemporary 
regressions, and (iii) different measurements of information sharing. 
 
 
                                                          
13
 With the Fisher-type (Choi, 2001) test, the variables are overwhelmingly stationary. These test results are 
available upon request. Some tests require balanced data and hence could not be performed. They include: The 
Levin–Lin–Chu (2002), Harris–Tzavalis (1999), Breitung (2000), Breitung and Das (2005) and The Hadri (2000). 
Moreover, because of insufficient observations, the Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) test could also not be performed.  
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4. Empirical results 
 Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5  present findings corresponding to linkages 
between mobiles and respectively ‘formal finance and PCR’, ‘informal finance and PCR’, 
‘formal finance and PCB’ and ‘informal finance and PCB’. It should be noted that the right-hand 
side (RHS) shows non-contemporary estimations and the left-hand side (LHS) of tables discloses 
contemporary regressions. Irrespective of tables, formal finance regressions consist of formal 
financial development (Panel A or Prop. 1) and financial sector formalisation (Panel B or Prop. 
2) while informal finance estimations entail informal financial development (Panel A or Prop. 3) 
and financial sector informalization (Panel B or Prop. 7). The interest of lagging the independent 
variables on the RHS by one period is to have some bite on endogeneity (see Mlachila et al., 
2017; Asongu et al., 2019a, 2019b). Consistent variations are apparent between QR and OLS 
estimates. The differences in terms of significance, signs and magnitude of estimated coefficient 
justify the distinction between an estimation based on mean values and one based on various 
points on the conditional distribution of financial sector development.  
 The following findings can be presented for Table 2 on the linkages between formal 
finance, mobile phones and PCR. First, from Panel A on formal financial development, with the 
exception of the 90th quantile, net effects of mobiles with PCR are positive. Second, the net 
effect is also positive on financial formalization in Panel B. The net effects are computed from 
the unconditional PCR and conditional or marginal PCR impacts which are contingent on the 
complementary effects of mobile phones. For example, in the second column of Table 2, the 
marginal effect (from the interaction) is -0.023 while the unconditional impact of PCR is 2.919. 
The corresponding net effect of PCR with mobile phones is 2.075 ([36.659×-0.023] + 2.919)14. 
This computation is consistent with contemporary interactive regressions literature (Agoba et al., 
2019; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c).  Third, the significant control variables have 
the expected signs for the most part.  
The following findings can be established for Table 3 on the linkages between informal 
finance, mobile phones and PCR. From Panel A on informal financial development, the net 
effect is positive at the 25th quantile. The net effect is also negative on financial informalization 
in Panel B at the 25th quantile and top quantiles of the distributions. Most of the control variables 
display expected signs.   
                                                          
14
 36.659 is the mean value of mobile phones.  
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In Table 4 on nexuses between formal finance, mobile phones and PCB: (i) the net effect 
is negative (positive) on the financial development formalization at 90th (25th) quantile of 
contemporary (non-contemporary) distributions while the effect is positive on financial 
formalization at the bottom quantiles and the 90th quantile and; (ii) the significant control 
variables have expected signs for the most part.  
The following are apparent in Table 5 on linkages between informal finance, mobile 
phones and PCB: (i) there are negative net effects on informal financial development at the 25th 
and 50th quantiles; (ii) there are also negative net impacts on financial informalization at the top 
quantiles (10th and 90th quantiles) of non-contemporary (contemporary) estimations; and (iii) the 
significant control variables display expected signs, for the most part. 
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Table 2: Formal Finance, Mobile Phones and Public Credit Registries (PCR)   
             
 Panel A: Formal Financial Development  (Prop. 1) 
 
 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  13.205*** 1.893 -0.872 3.106 16.228*** 24.923*** 13.890*** 2.422* 0.262 3.132 13.334** 23.709*** 
 (0.002) (0.275) (0.717) (0.442) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.085) (0.928) (0.424) (0.012) (0.000) 
PCR 2.919*** 1.582*** 3.406*** 3.079*** 2.659*** 0.546 2.687*** 1.849*** 2.463*** 3.446*** 2.574*** 0.281 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.298) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.594) 
Mobile 0.227*** 0.157*** 0.201*** 0.227*** 0.327*** 0.228*** 0.255*** 0.157*** 0.242*** 0.261*** 0.406*** 0.196*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
PCR×Mobile -0.023*** -0.015*** -0.031*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.002 -0.022** -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.021** -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.632) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.841) 
GDP growth  -0.129 -0.131 -0.277** -0.265 0.442** 0.622*** -0.078 -0.023 -0.066 -0.306 0.578** 0.715*** 
 (0.527) (0.125) (0.026) (0.225) (0.015) (0.004) (0.716) (0.802) (0.696) (0.138) (0.022) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.004 0.008 0.007 -0.002 0.030 -0.002 -0.012 0.010 0.016 -0.013 0.014 -0.026 
 (0.737) (0.255) (0.546) (0.925) (0.156) (0.908) (0.539) (0.187) (0.270) (0.517) (0.592) (0.162) 
Public Invt.  0.068 -0.137 -0.046 0.631*** -0.091 0.371** 0.054 -0.179*** 0.004 0.560*** 0.039 0.217 
 (0.772) (0.121) (0.770) (0.000) (0.568) (0.047) (0.837) (0.002) (0.984) (0.005) (0.863) (0.262) 
Foreign Aid  0.019 0.022 0.259*** -0.046 0.010 -0.297 -0.015 -0.010 0.184 0.023 -0.010 -0.344 
 (0.890) (0.765) (0.006) (0.766) (0.949) (0.195) (0.915) (0.861) (0.116) (0.876) (0.961) (0.112) 
Trade  -0.061* 0.022 0.025 0.040 -0.058** -0.056 -0.051 0.025 0.021 0.050 -0.027 0.030 
 (0.083) (0.173) (0.219) (0.239) (0.048) (0.107) (0.185) (0.104) (0.405) (0.127) (0.526) (0.388) 
Middle Income 9.357*** -1.656 0.922 -1.121 12.689*** 36.773*** 8.823*** -1.745 0.283 -2.140 7.913** 36.069*** 
 (0.001) (0.144) (0.544) (0.669) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.138) (0.882) (0.415) (0.012) (0.000) 
Common Law 5.963** 8.446*** 8.511*** 7.065*** 0.928 1.414 6.051** 9.120*** 7.747*** 7.241*** 2.415 0.954 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.633) (0.596) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.396) (0.736) 
Net  effects 2.075 1.032 2.269 2.309 1.962 na 1.880 1.115 1.619 2.492 1.804 na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.378 0.210 0.162 0.218 0.318 0.405 0.375 0.208 0.164 0.229 0.314 0.404 
Fisher  23.31***      20.22***      
Observations  294 294 294 294 294 294 258 258 258 258 258 258 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial Development Formalization  (Prop. 5) 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
 
            
Constant  0.583*** 0.307*** 0.511*** 0.635*** 0.667*** 0.722*** 0.584*** 0.321*** 0.499*** 0.630*** 0.677*** 0.687*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 0.010*** 0.024*** 0.011** 0.004 0.004** 0.0007 0.010*** 0.023*** 0.015* 0.006** 0.005 -0.0006 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.218) (0.023) (0.878) (0.000) (0.000) (0.071) (0.048) (0.159) (0.928) 
Mobile 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.0005* 0.0006*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.0005** 0.0004 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.059) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.032) (0.047) (0.110) (0.000) 
PCR×Mobile -
0.0001*** 
-
0.0002*** 
-0.0001** -0.00004 -
0.00006** 
-0.00005 -
0.0001*** 
-
0.0002*** 
-0.0001 -0.00006* -0.00006* -0.00006 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.319) (0.011) (0.295) (0.000) (0.000) (0.114) (0.086) (0.099) (0.464) 
GDP growth  0.001 0.0004 0.0007 0.003** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 0.0002 -0.0001 0.003*** 0.001 0.004 
 (0.564) (0.884) (0.746) (0.017) (0.000) (0.382) (0.569) (0.930) (0.968) (0.008) (0.290) (0.279) 
Inflation 0.0002* 0.0008*** 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001* -0.00009 0.0003 0.0008** 0.0002 0.00007 0.0001 -0.00001 
 (0.063) (0.000) (0.112) (0.481) (0.078) (0.655) (0.222) (0.017) (0.389) (0.531) (0.585) (0.965) 
Public Invt.  0.005*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005 0.006*** 0.005*** -0.0004 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.0000) (0.417) (0.000) (0.000) (0.164) (0.000) (0.000) (0.868) 
Foreign Aid  0.001 0.004** -0.0009 -0.00003 -0.0001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.0001 0.0003 0.005* 
 (0.343) (0.022) (0.479) (0.973) (0.247) (0.139) (0.306) (0.182) (0.564) (0.850) (0.741) (0.075) 
Trade  -0.0005* -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 0.098*** -0.0004 -0.0005* -0.0001 0.00005 -0.00008 -0.00007 -0.0004 
 (0.059) (0.419) (0.504) (0.415) (0.000) (0.259) (0.092) (0.751) (0.923) (0.658) (0.724) (0.497) 
Middle Income 0.096*** 0.066** 0.024 0.090*** 0.133*** 0.098*** 0.091*** 0.083* 0.051 0.088*** 0.092*** 0.096** 
 (0.000) (0.037) (0.288) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.060) (0.209) (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) 
Common Law 0.150*** 0.163*** 0.135*** 0.106*** 0.667*** 0.095*** 0.151*** 0.165*** 0.148*** 0.104*** 0.132*** 0.109*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Net  effects 0.006 0.016 0.007 na 0.001 na 0.006 0.015 na 0.003 na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.422 0.309 0.212 0.213 0.242 0.254 0.427 0.325 0.214 0.225 0.245 0.243 
Fisher  17.95***      15.89***      
Observations  294 294 294 294 294 294 258 258 258 258 258 258 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. Mobile: Mobile phone 
penetration rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where financial sector development is least.  
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Table 3: Informal Finance, Mobile Phones and Public Credit Registries (PCR)   
             
 Panel A: Informal Financial Development  (Prop. 3) 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  8.183*** 4.554** 7.559*** 8.611*** 9.909*** 11.892*** 8.557*** 3.763 7.109*** 8.569*** 10.047*** 12.094*** 
 (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.106) (0.000) (0..000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 0.245* 0.394 0.427*** 0.201 0.092 -0.127 0.204* 0.316 0.458*** 0.271* 0.105 -0.109 
 (0.071) (0.439) (0.000) (0.148) (0.337) (0.606) (0.053) (0.210) (0.000) (0.061) (0.322) (0.656) 
Mobile 0.006 -0.032 0.003 0.028*** 0.036*** 0.044* 0.002 -0.046 -0.001 0.023** 0.040*** 0.059*** 
 (0.723) (0.195) (0.446) (0.003) (0.000) (0.095) (0.914) (0.204) (0.820) (0.038) (0.000) (0.002) 
PCR×Mobile -0.002 -0.002 -0.003*** -0.002 -0.001 0.0008 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002 -0.001 0.0005 
 (0.189) (0.692) (0.001) (0.204) (0.289) (0.745) (0.285) (0.667) (0.004) (0.103) (0.269) (0.849) 
GDP growth  -0.090* -0.143 -0.087*** -0.042 -0.075** -0.073 -0.064 -0.119 -0.089** -0.071 -0.043 -0.157** 
 (0.088) (0.234) (0.003) (0.397) (0.011) (0.463) (0.264) (0.514) (0.015) (0.153) (0.248) (0.018) 
Inflation -
0.0002*** 
-0.00009 -
0.0001*** 
-
0.0001*** 
-
0.0002*** 
-
0.0002*** 
-
0.0001*** 
-0.0001 -
0.0001*** 
-0.0002 
*** 
-0.0002 
*** 
-
0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.126) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.202) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -0.175*** -0.023 -0.084*** -0.135*** -0.080*** -0.179 -0.207*** -0.072 -0.101*** -0.203*** -0.129*** -0.142* 
 (0.000) (0.846) (0.000) (0.006) (0.006) (0.104) (0.000) (0.622) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.058) 
Foreign Aid  0.002 -0.021 -0.064*** -0.009 -0.050** 0.013 -0.005 -0.005 -0.060*** -0.028 -0.045* 0.032 
 (0.939) (0.837) (0.001) (0.805) (0.015) (0.847) (0.865) (0.966) (0.007) (0.437) (0.059) (0.396) 
Trade  0.012 0.012 -0.009** -0.013* -0.007 -0.003 0.010 0.019 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.014 
 (0.204) (0.573) (0.017) (0.097) (0.239) (0.821) (0.308) (0.467) (0.790) (0.894) (0.543) (0.261) 
Middle Income -1.015* -2.148* -2.633*** -0.019 -0.336 0.608 -0.790 -0.892 -2.720*** -0.461 -0.289 0.698 
 (0.080) (0.094) (0.000) (0.975) (0.454) (0.674) (0.197) (0.580) (0.000) (0.477) (0.576) (0.481) 
Common Law -4.626*** -3.134** -1.910*** -3.501*** -3.896*** -6.098*** -4.938*** -2.677* -1.982*** -3.415*** -4.182*** -5.394*** 
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net  effects na na 0.317 na na na na na 0.348 na na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.229 0.148 0.175 0.191 0.228 0.217 0.246 0.130 0.173 0.194 0.243 0.266 
Fisher  42.26***      40.74***      
Observations  309 309 309 309 309 309 275 275 275 275 275 275 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial Development Informalization  (Prop. 7) 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
 
            
Constant  0.403*** 0.198*** 0.296*** 0.364*** 0.499*** 0.706*** 0.401*** 0.193*** 0.288*** 0.359*** 0.532*** 0.707*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR -0.009*** -0.002 -0.005** -0.007* -0.013** -0.023*** -0.009*** -0.001 -0.005 -0.006 -0.015** -0.022*** 
 (0.001) (0.650) (0.033) (0.088) (0.038) (0.000) (0.001) (0.828) (0.190) (0.227) (0.023) (0.000) 
Mobile -0.001*** -0.002*** -
0.0006*** 
-0.0005 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.001** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.114) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.212) (0.149) (0.020) (0.002) 
PCR×Mobile 0.0001*** 0.00006 0.00006** 0.00006 0.0001* 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.00005 0.00007 0.00007 0.0001* 0.0002*** 
 (0.001) (0.266) (0.020) (0.154) (0.060) (0.000) (0.001) (0.436) (0.144) (0.278) (0.051) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.0007 -0.00008 -0.001 -0.003 -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003* -0.0003 0.001 
 (0.745) (0.977) (0.325) (0.106) (0.914) (0.762) (0.790) (0.766) (0.533) (0.078) (0.919) (0.751) 
Inflation -
0.0005*** 
-0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0005** -0.0006 
*** 
-0.001*** -0.0006** -0.00007 -0.00008 -0.0004** -0.0006** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.747) (0.112) (0.036) (0.009) (0.000) (0.019) (0.849) (0.602) (0.016) (0.010) (0.003) 
Public Invt.  -0.005*** -0.003* -0.004*** -0.003** -0.006** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.003* -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007** -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (0.038) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.000) (0.008) (0.027) (0.001) 
Foreign Aid  -0.001 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 0.0002 0.0002 -0.002 -0.005** 
 (0.356) (0.644) (0.712) (0.470) (0.427) (0.005) (0.317) (0.526) (0.866) (0.880) (0.160) (0.035) 
Trade  0.0005* 0.0009** 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.00009 0.0005* 0.0008 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.053) (0.032) (0.183) (0.387) (0.793) (0.837) (0.084) (0.119) (0.573) (0.638) (0.780) (0.853) 
Middle Income -0.090*** -0.097*** -0.079*** -0.097*** -0.055* -0.043 -0.086*** -0.072** -0.081*** -0.090*** -0.048 -0.064 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.083) (0.172) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.161) (0.175) 
Common Law -0.159*** -0.106*** -0.129*** 0.110*** -0.156*** -0.191*** -0.159*** -0.087*** -0.126*** -0.105*** -0.162*** -0.187*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net  effects -0.005 na -0.002 na -0.009 -0.015 -0.005 na na na -0.011 -0.014 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.414 0.226 0.222 0.206 0.221 0.327 0.419 0.212 0.221 0.216 0.227 0.338 
Fisher  18.04***      16.92***      
Observations  294 294 294 294 294 294 258 258 258 258 258 258 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. Mobile: Mobile phone 
penetration rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where financial sector development is least.  
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Table 4: Formal Finance, Mobile Phones and Private Credit Bureaus (PCB)   
             
 Panel A: Formal Financial  Development (Prop. 1) 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  12.905*** 3.870* 11.398*** 9.529*** 10.884*** 21.279*** 13.467*** 4.932** 12.728*** 7.634*** 11.670*** 15.673*** 
 (0.007) (0.070) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.007) (0.018) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
PCB 0.117 0.246*** 0.468*** 0.235*** 0.250** -0.704*** 0.119 0.304*** 0.449*** 0.386*** 0.274* -0.360*** 
 (0.419) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.035) (0.000) (0.421) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.000) 
Mobile 0.269*** 0.119*** 0.164*** 0.209*** 0.403*** 0.252*** 0.307*** -0.0004 0.203*** 0.261*** 0.468*** 0.290*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.582) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB×Mobile -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002* -0.0002 -0.035 -0.002* -0.0002 -0.002 -0.0008 
 (0.898) (0.867) (0.133) (0.185) (0.188) (0.070- (0.915) (0.745) (0.077) (0.888) (0.175) (0.423) 
GDP growth  -0.056 -0.041 -0.084 -0.358*** 0.850*** 0.870*** -0.001 0.025*** 0.004 -0.359** 0.475*** 1.037*** 
 (0.799) (0.716) (0.556) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.994) (0.007) (0.977) (0.014) (0.003) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.004 0.024*** 0.025** -0.003 0.052*** 0.0004 -0.014 0.061 0.028*** -0.009 0.015 -0.006 
 (0.778) (0.005) (0.046) (0.821) (0.0008) (0.975) (0.596) (0.617) (0.006) (0.492) (0.398) (0.669) 
Public Invt.  0.064 0.058 0.075 0.549*** -0.041 0.303** 0.024 0.115 0.198 0.394*** 0.017 0.210 
 (0.785) (0.678) (0.629) (0.000) (0.771) (0.033) (0.923) (0.147) (0.141) (0.003) (0.912) (0.139) 
Foreign Aid  0.049 0.093 0.215** 0.039 -0.041 0.242 0.009 -0.021 0.100 0.115 -0.005 -0.194 
 (0.753) (0.310) (0.030) (0.613) (0.787) (0.242) (0.953) (0.227) (0.258) (0.238) (0.971) (0.215) 
Trade  -0.020 -0.017 -0.075*** 0.016 0.031 -0.029 -0.010 0.381 -0.088*** 0.057*** 0.040 0.046* 
 (0.577) (0.385) (0.000) (0.324) (0.217) (0.300) (0.798) (0.747) (0.000) (0.008) (0.143) (0.063) 
Middle Income 8.561*** 0.434 1.915 -0.493 6.026*** 40.185*** 7.386** 4.196*** 0.539 -1.350 2.413 37.582*** 
 (0.002) (0.746) (0.223) (0.707) (0.005) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.695) (0.439) (0.285) (0.000) 
Common Law 1.354 4.450*** -0.137 1.789* -4.539** 3.780* 1.683 4.932** -0.058 1.328 -2.013 3.179 
 (0.584) (0.000) (0.914) (0.091) (0.012) (0.079) (0.512) (0.018) (0.959) (0.345) (0.304) (0.120) 
Net  effects na na na na na -0.630 na na 0.449 na na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.307 0.214 0.172 0.209 0.269 0.431 0.324 0.218 0.170 0.228 0.287 0.431 
Fisher  22.29***      20.91***      
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 295 259 259 259 259 259 259 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial Development Formalization  (Prop. 5) 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  0.591*** 0.364*** 0.557*** 0.622*** 0.706*** 0.743*** 0.595*** 0.348*** 0.558*** 0.638*** 0.701*** 0.745*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB 0.003** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.0004 0.001* 0.003* 0.008*** 0.005** 0.002** -0.001 0.002** 
 (0.012) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.671) (0.061) (0.064) (0.000) (0.016) (0.044) (0.384) (0.017) 
Mobile 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.00006 
*** 
0.0003 0.0002 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.0005** 0.0001 0.0003* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.198) (0.302) (0.000) (0.006) (0.010) (0.039) (0.546) (0.063) 
PCB×Mobile 0.000005 -0.00004 
*** 
-0.00003* -0.00001 0.00008**
* 
0.00007**
* 
0.00001 -0.00007 
*** 
-0.00005* 0.000006 0.0001*** 0.00007**
* 
 (0.827) (0.001) (0.066) (0.293) (0.000) (0.000) (0.543) (0.000) (0.058) (0.667) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.002 0.00007 0.001 0.004*** 0.002 0.0001 0.002 0.0000001 0.004 0.006*** 0.002* 0.0006 
 (0.390) (0.979) (0.654) (0.000) (0.102) (0.804) (0.396) (1.000) (0.302) (0.000) (0.055) (0.330) 
Inflation 0.0004*** 0.0008*** 0.0002 0.0002 -0.00002 -0.0002 
*** 
0.0004* 0.001*** 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0005*** 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.231) (0.300) (0.855) (0.004) (0.064) (0.006) (0.112) (0.139) (0.396) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.005 0.002 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.015) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.114) (0.102) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  0.002* 0.003* -0.002 0.001* 0.0006 0.0002 0.002 0.005** -0.0005 0.0006 0.0003 0.0008 
 (0.093) (0.065) (0.154) (0.076) (0.540) (0.800) (0.110) (0.048) (0.798) (0.488) (0.728) (0.390) 
Trade  -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 -0.00006 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0001 0.00005 0.0001 
 (0.160) (0.535) (0.575) (0.456) (0.745) (0.229) (0.252) (0.334) (0.387) (0.487) (0.779) (0.466) 
Middle Income 0.080*** 0.100*** 0.0007 0.064*** 0.061*** 0.034** 0.074*** 0.114** 0.049 0.064*** 0.058*** 0.040*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.976) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.001) (0.017) (0.220) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) 
Common Law 0.087*** 0.120*** 0.109*** 0.073*** 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.087*** 0.106*** 0.090*** 0.075*** 0.065*** 0.058*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net  effects na 0.004 0.003 na na 0.003 na 0.005 0.003 na na 0.004 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.525 0.332 0.252 0.270 0.345 0.488 0.533 0.344 0.246 0.275 0.363 0.497 
Fisher  20.81***      18.85***      
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 295 259 259 259 259 259 259 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. Mobile: Mobile phone 
penetration rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where financial sector development is least.  
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Table 5: Informal Finance, Mobile Phones and Private Credit Bureaus (PCB)   
              
 Panel A: Informal Financial  Development (Prop. 3) 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  8.143*** 3.308*** 5.014*** 8.682*** 10.029*** 12.994*** 8.292*** 0.102 4.765*** 8.940*** 10.572*** 12.560*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.921) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB -0.059 -0.036 0.074* -0.073*** -0.073** -0.108 -0.015 0.075 0.082** -0.065** -0.089*** -0.086 
 (0.360) (0.136) (0.054) (0.001) (0.047) (0.142) (0.826) (0.272) (0.042) (0.015) (0.004) (0.346) 
Mobile 0.045*** 0.018 0.048*** 0.029*** 0.043*** 0.047** 0.046*** 0.033** 0.050*** 0.028*** 0.042*** 0.051** 
 (0.000) (0.145) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.049) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) 
PCB×Mobile -0.001* -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.0004* -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.002** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.0007* -0.0003 -0.0005 
 (0.072) (0.000) (0.000) (0.072) (0.262) (0.384) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.054) (0.332) (0.553) 
GDP growth  -0.112** -0.076 -0.068 -0.110*** -0.072* 0.017 -0.101* -0.088 -0.074 -0.066** -0.073** -0.155** 
 (0.024) (0.281) (0.275) (0.000) (0.061) (0.823) (0.077) (0.256) (0.210) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) 
Inflation -
0.0002*** 
-
0.0001*** 
-
0.0002*** 
-
0.0002*** 
-
0.0002*** 
-
0.0002*** 
-
0.0002*** 
-
0.0001*** 
-
0.0002*** 
-
0.0002*** 
-
0.0002*** 
-
0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -0.155*** -0.175*** -0.201*** -0.104*** -0.057 -0.139* -0.170*** -0.100 -0.208*** -0.161*** -0.064* -0.124 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.107) (0.082) (0.002) (0.135) (0.000) (0.000) (0.055) (0.112) 
Foreign Aid  -0.040 -0.0004 0.009 -0.036* -0.055** -0.113** -0.040 0.060 0.006 -0.045* -0.073*** -0.016 
 (0.135) (0.991) (0.810) (0.078) (0.038) (0.047) (0.132) (0.290) (0.870) (0.057) (0..004) (0.720) 
Trade  0.002 0.012 0.013 -0.009** -0.010 -0.021 0.001 0.034*** 0.019** -0.006 -0.012** -0.017 
 (0.747) (0.146) (0.110) (0.029) (0.158) (0.116) (0.851) (0.006) (0.025) (0.213) (0.040) (0.226) 
Middle Income -0.309 -0.646 -1.642** 0.416 -0.150 1.934 -0.249 -1.347 -1.948*** 0.403 0.095 0.943 
 (0.519) (0.279) (0.012) (0.245) (0.774) (0.126) (0.635à (0.114) (0.002) (0.329) (0.835) (0.383) 
Common Law -2.831*** -1.646 -1.789*** -2.987*** -4.014*** -4.751*** -3.122*** -1.202 -1.823*** -3.234*** -3.995*** -4.793*** 
 (0.000) (0.279) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.112) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net  effects na na -0.072 -0.087 na na na na -0.101 -0.090 na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.448 0.421 0.287 0.282 0.296 0.257 0.479 0.416 0.297 0.282 0.310 0.308 
Fisher  34.99***      30.12***      
Observations  310 310 310 310 310 310 276 276 276 276 276 276 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial Development Informalization  (Prop. 7) 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
 
            
Constant  0.397*** 0.214*** 0.308*** 0.380*** 0.474*** 0.669*** 0.392*** 0.223*** 0.294*** 0.384*** 0.465*** 0.688*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB -0.003** -0.001* -0.0007 -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.002 -0.001 0.0009 -0.002*** -0.004** -0.008*** 
 (0.023) (0.084) (0.414) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.100) (0.173) (0.503) (0.009) (0.011) (0.0000) 
Mobile -
0.0008*** 
-0.0001 -0.0003 -
0.0005*** 
-0.001** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.0001 -0.0005* -0.0006 
*** 
-0.001* -0.002*** 
 (0.002) (0.544) (0.107) (0.007) (0.017) (0.000) (0.001) (0.638) (0.088) (0.009) (0.071) (0.001) 
PCB×Mobile -0.000008 -0.00006 
*** 
-0.00007 
*** 
0.000008 0.00003 0.00006**
* 
-0.00002 -0.0008 
*** 
-
0.0001*** 
-0.000004 0.00004* 0.00008**
* 
 (0.728) (0.000) (0.000) (0.428) (0.119) (0.000) (0.482) (0.000) (0.000) (0.757) (0.094) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.004*** -0.001 0.0001 -0.001 0.0008 -0.002* -0.006*** -0.001 0.00002 
 (0.541) (0.014) (0.111) (0.000) (0.627) (0.974) (0.563) (0.338) (0.057) (0.000) (0.774) (0.995) 
Inflation -
0.0006*** 
-0.0001 -
0.0003*** 
-
0.0005*** 
-0.0006 
*** 
-0.001*** -0.0007 
*** 
0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0006 
*** 
-0.0006** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.133) (0.009) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.133) (0.059) (0.000) (0.031) (0.001) 
Public Invt.  -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.002** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.005) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.002 0.001* -0.0005 -0.001** -0.001 -0.005** -0.002 0.001 -0.0003 -0.001* -0.0006 -0.006** 
 (0.105) (0.076) (0.585) (0.011) (0.363) (0.036) (0.121) (0.276) (0.785) (0.060) (0.773) (0.030) 
Trade  0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.00002 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0004*** -0.00002 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 
 (0.160) (0.107) (0.201) (0.411) (0.944) (0.508) (0.246) (0.004) 0.920) (0.328) (0.766) (0.592) 
Middle Income -0.074*** -0.030** -0.056*** -0.064*** -0.027 -0.059 -0.070*** -0.009 -0.048** -0.062*** -0.036 -0.077 
 (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.357) (0.140) (0.002) (0.536) (0.013) (0.000) (0.334) (0.150) 
Common Law -0.098*** -0.070*** -0.061*** -0.074*** -0.118*** -0.159*** -0.097*** -0.061*** -0.068*** -0.076*** -0.124*** -0.143*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net  effects na -0.003 na na na -0.004 na na na na -0.002 -0.005 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.511 0.459 0.319 0.262 0.261 0.342 0.520 0.465 0.340 0.264 0.253 0.349 
Fisher  20.03***      17.68***      
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 295 259 259 259 259 259 259 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. Mobile: Mobile phone 
penetration rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where financial sector development is least.  
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5. Conclusion and future research directions  
 
We set out to investigate linkages between the mobile phone, information sharing 
mechanisms and financial sector development in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011. 
For this purpose, we have proposed measures of financial sector development based on a 
rethinking of the mainstream financial system definition that the propositions have challenged by 
inter alia: (i) providing a financial system definition that incorporates the previously missing 
informal financial sector; (ii) disentangling the mainstream definition of the financial system into 
its semi-formal and formal components and (iii) introducing the concept of financialization 
within the framework of development in the financial sector.  
Information sharing offices (ISOs) in the financial sector include pubic credit registries 
(PCR) and private credit bureaus (PCB) while the information and communication technology 
(ICT) by which the sharing of such information is facilitated is proxied by the mobile phone. The 
theoretical underpinnings build on the fact that: (i)  ISOs are meant to stimulate financial sector 
development;  (ii) ISOs also have to act as a disciplining device in preventing borrowers from 
defaulting on their debts and resorting to the informal financial sector and (iii) mobile phone 
banking is related to both the formal and informal financial sectors.  
The empirical evidence is based on contemporary and non-contemporary quantile 
regressions (QR). The policy relevance of the approach is based on the intuition that mean values 
provide blanket policy recommendations that could be inefficient unless such policies are 
contingent on initial levels of financial sector development and tailored differently across 
countries with low, intermediate and high  initial levels of financial sector development.   
Two main hypotheses have been tested: mobile phones complement ISO to enhance the 
formal financial sector (Hypothesis 1) and mobile phones complement ISO to reduce the 
informal financial sector (Hypothesis 2). The hypotheses are confirmed for the most part with the 
following findings. First, on the linkages between formal finance, mobile phones and PCR: (i) 
with the exception of the 90th  quantile, net effects of mobiles with PCR are positive on formal 
financial development and (ii) net effects are also positive on financial formalization. Second, on 
the linkages between informal finance, mobile phones and PCR, the net effects are:  (i) positive 
on informal financial development at the 25th quantile and (ii) negative on financial 
informalization at the 25th quantile and top quantiles of the distributions. Third, on nexuses 
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between formal finance, mobile phones and PCB: (i) the net effect is negative (positive) on the 
financial development formalization at the 90th (25th) quantile of contemporary (non-
contemporary) distributions while the effect is positive on financial formalization at the bottom 
quantiles and 90th quantile. Fourth, on the linkages between informal finance, mobile phones and 
PCB: (i) there are negative net effects on informal financial development at the 25th and 50th 
quantiles and (ii) there are also negative net impacts on financial informalization at the top 
quantiles (10th and 90th quantile) of non-contemporary (contemporary) estimations.  
While the findings cannot be directly compared to the literature on the nexus between 
information sharing and financial access, if it is assumed that formal financial sector 
development is synonymous with more possibilities of financial access, then the findings can be 
compared with the engaged literature in the introduction. Overall the findings are broadly 
consistent with the attendant literature maintaining that the introduction of information sharing 
offices improves credit access facilities and limits financial access constraints. The studies with 
conclusions that are broadly in line with those of this study include: Galindo and Miller (2001), 
Love and Mylenko (2003), Singh et al. (2009),  Triki and Gajigo (2014), Kusi et al. (2017) and 
Kusi and Opoku‐  Mensah (2018).  
The main policy implication from the study is that the use of information technologies as 
instruments through which information sharing offices reduce information asymmetry in the 
banking industry should be encouraged, not least because such complementarity promotes the 
formal financial sector to the detriment of the informal financial sector and by extension the 
informal economy. This main implication is worthwhile because the objective of every country 
is to formalize transactions both in the formal financial and economic sectors.  
The main scholarly implication of the study is on a methodological front. Accordingly, by 
introducing previously unexplored dimensions of financial sector development, the study has 
contributed to two streams of research, notably by simultaneously contributing to the growing 
field of economic development by means of informal finance and micro finance on the one hand 
and on the other hand, the stream of literature on the measurement of financial development. The 
latter contribution builds on the fact that we have proposed a practicable way of disentangling 
the impact of information sharing on various financial sectors.  
Future inquiries can improve the extant literature by assessing other mechanisms by 
which ISOs promote financial access and formal financial development. Furthermore, 
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positioning future research on inclusive financial development could elicit some policy 
syndromes in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda, notably: ICT and ISO channels for 
poverty and inequality reduction. An exploratory analysis shows that English Common law 
countries within the context of the study are performing better than their French Civil law 
counterparts. However, in order not to deviate too much from the scope of the study, it will be 
worthwhile for future research to critically engage a comparative study based on colonial legal 
origins. Muazu and Alagidede (2017) is a relevant starting point in this future direction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics (2004-2011) 
  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
  
     
 
 
 
Financial 
Sector 
Development  
Formal Financial Development (Prop.1) 28.037 20.970 2.926 92.325 377 
Semi-formal Financial Development (Prop. 2) 0.199 0.715 0.000 4.478 424 
Informal Financial Development (Prop. 3) 5.350 5.106 -18.89 25.674 424 
Non-formal Financial Development (Prop. 4) 5.550 5.171 -18.89 25.674 424 
Financial Formalization (Prop. 5) 0.773 0.168 0.235 1.469 377 
Financial Semi-formalization (Prop. 6) 0.007 0.029 0.000 0.244 377 
Financial Informalization (Prop. 7) 0.219 0.168 -0.469 0.764 377 
Financia Non-formalization (Prop. 8) 0.226 0.168 -0.469 0.764 377 
  
     
Information 
Asymmetry   
Public Credit registries (PCR) 2.155 5.812 0.000 49.8 381 
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 4.223 13.734 0.000 64.8 380 
       
ICT Mobile Phone Penetration   36.659 32.848 0.214 171.51 420 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.996 4.556 -17.66 37.998 404 
Inflation 7.801 4.720   0 43.011 357 
Public Investment 74.778 1241.70 -8.974 24411 387 
Development Assistance  10.396 12.958 0.027 147.05 411 
Trade Openness (Trade) 80.861 32.935 24.968 186.15 392 
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. GDPg: GDP growth. Obs: Observations. 
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Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis (Uniform sample size : 293) 
     
        
Financial Sector Development   Info. Asymmetry Control Variables  
Prop.1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Prop.4 Prop.5 Prop.6 Prop.7 Prop.8 PCR PCB GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade Mobile  
1.000 0.110 0.127 0.142 0.565 -0.052 -0.556 -0.565 0.411 0.310 -0.094 -0.071 0.058 -0.311 0.141 0.515 Prop.1 
 1.000 -0.013 0.130 -0.031 0.872 -0.128 0.031 -0.023 -0.100 -0.060 0.260 -0.040 0.007 -0.086 -0.087 Prop.2 
  1.000 0.989 -0.604 -0.068 0.617 0.604 0.127 -0.569 -0.083 -0.082 -0.054 0.033 -0.006 -0.055 Prop.3 
   1.000 -0.604 0.057 0.593 0.604 0.123 -0.579 -0.091 -0.044 -0.059 0.034 -0.018 -0.067 Prop.4 
    1.000 -0.092 -0.983 -1.000 0.094 0.613 -0.004 0.008 0.128 -0.246 0.119 0.430 Prop.5 
     1.000 -0.091 0.092 -0.059 -0.084 -0.077 0.289 -0.012 0.123 -0.074 -0.133 Prop.6 
      1.000 0.983 -0.083 -0.598 0.018 -0.061 -0.125 0.224 -0.105 -0.407 Prop.7 
       1.000 -0.094 -0.613 0.004 -0.008 -0.128 0.246 -0.119 -0.403 Prop.8 
        1.000 -0.140 -0.026 -0.081 0.068 -0.154 0.207 0.369 PCR 
         1.000 -0.101 -0.035 -0.047 -0.329 0.084 0.388 PCB 
          1.000 -0.169 0.129 0.122 0.037 -0.178 GDPg 
           1.000 -0.081 -0.0004 -0.006 -0.054 Inflation  
            1.000 0.059 0.130 0.079 PubIvt 
             1.000 -0.309 -0.504 NODA 
              1.000 0.198 Trade 
               1.000 Mobile 
                 
Prop.1: Formal Financial Sector Development. Prop.2: Semi-Formal Financial Sector Development. Prop.3: Informal Financial Sector Development. Prop. 4: Non-Formal Financial Development. 
Prop.5: Financial Sector Formalization. Prop.6: Financial Sector Semi-Formalization. Prop.7: Financial Sector Informalization. Prop.8: Financial Sector Non-Formalization. Info: Information. PCR: 
Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. GDPg: GDP growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Info: Information. ICT: Information and 
Communication Technology.  Mobile:  Mobile Phone Penetration.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
Formal Financial 
Development  
Prop.1 Bank deposits/GDP. Bank deposits here refer to demand, time 
and saving deposits in deposit money banks (Lines 24 and 25 
of International Financial Statistics (IFS); October 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
Asongu (2014a; 
2015ab) 
 
 
   
Semi-formal  financial 
development 
Prop.3 
  (Financial deposits – Bank deposits)/ GDP.    Financial 
deposits are demand, time and saving deposits in deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions. (Lines 24, 25 
and 45 of IFS, October, 2008). 
   
Informal  financial 
development 
Prop.3 (Money Supply – Financial deposits)/GDP 
   
Informal and semi-formal 
financial development  
Prop.4 (Money  Supply –  Bank deposits)/GDP 
   
Financial intermediary 
formalization 
Prop.5 Bank deposits/ Money Supply (M2). From ‘informal and 
semi-formal’ to formal financial development (formalization) 
   
Financial intermediary 
‘semi-formalization’ 
Prop.6 (Financial deposits - Bank deposits)/ Money Supply. From 
‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal financial development 
(Semi-formalization) 
   
Financial intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
Prop.7 (Money Supply – Financial deposits)/ Money Supply. From 
‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal financial development 
(Informalisation). 
   
Financial intermediary 
‘semi-formalization and 
informalization’ 
Prop.8 (Money Supply – Bank Deposits)/Money Supply.  Formal to 
‘informal and semi-formal’ financial development: (Semi-
formalization and informalization). 
    
Information Asymmetry  PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
   
PCB Private credit bureau coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Information and 
Communication Technology 
Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
   
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Development Assistance    NODA Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade openness  Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
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   Appendix 4: Fisher-type unit root tests  
    
 ADF 
  Constant  Constant and trend  
 
Prop.1 
P 134.261*** 435.406*** 
Z -2.378*** -4.011*** 
L° -2.498*** -13.523*** 
Pm 3.115*** 24.100*** 
 
Prop. 2 
P 30.936** 67.843 
Z -2.624*** -3.410*** 
L° -2.550*** -5.491*** 
Pm 2.640*** -2.620 
 
Prop. 3 
P 206.553*** 350.638*** 
Z -6.133*** -4.276*** 
L° -6.398*** -9.426*** 
Pm 7.753*** 16.801*** 
 
Prop. 4 
P 204.789*** 391.109*** 
Z -6.007*** -5.041*** 
L° -6.261*** -11.094*** 
Pm 7.627*** 19.581*** 
 
Prop. 5 
P 195.589*** 561.285*** 
Z -6.341*** -7.902*** 
L° -6.439*** -19.506*** 
Pm 7.636*** 33.091*** 
 
Prop. 6 
P 26.695** 33.158*** 
Z -2.620*** -3.434*** 
L° -2.512*** -3.566*** 
Pm 2.399*** -4.631 
 
Prop. 7 
P 205.534*** 648.042*** 
Z -6.932*** -9.537*** 
L° -7.070*** -23.697*** 
Pm 8.369*** 39.288*** 
 
Prop. 8 
P 195.589*** 561.285*** 
Z -6.341*** -7.902*** 
L° -6.439*** -19.506*** 
Pm 7.636*** 33.091*** 
 
PCR 
P 116.238*** 303.026*** 
Z -4.696*** -8.206*** 
L° -4.811*** -15.639*** 
Pm 6.299*** 14.074*** 
 
PCB 
P 30.896** 21.052 
Z -0.979 -1.260 
L° -0.845 -1.405* 
Pm 2.149** -5.667 
 
Mobile 
P 119.097 349.552*** 
Z 0.193 -3.682*** 
L° -0.049 -8.417*** 
Pm 1.197 16.727*** 
 
GDPg 
P 283.468*** 526.748*** 
Z -10.054*** -9.272*** 
L° -10.151*** -17.887*** 
Pm 12.705*** 29.738*** 
 
Inflation  
P 304.162*** 441.705*** 
Z -11.618*** -5.839*** 
L° -11.976*** -13.910*** 
Pm 15.327*** 24.162*** 
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Public Investment  
P 168.867*** 93.475 
Z -5.254*** 2.056 
L° -5.292*** 1.629 
Pm 6.095*** -0.038 
 
NODA 
P 223.137*** 360.832*** 
Z -7.680*** -3.746*** 
L° -7.560*** -8.608*** 
Pm 8.481*** 17.808*** 
 
Trade 
P 218.117*** 194.365*** 
Z -7.965*** -0.925 
L° -7.772*** -3.531*** 
Pm 8.813*** 6.672*** 
    
**,***: significance levels of 5% and 1% respectively. c:constant. ct : constant and trend. ADF: Augmented Dickey Fuller. The lag difference 
length is one. P: Inverse chi-squared. Z: Inverse normal. L°: Inverse logit t. Pm: Modified inv. chi-squared.  Prop.1: Formal Financial Sector 
Development. Prop.2: Semi-Formal Financial Sector Development. Prop.3: Informal Financial Sector Development. Prop. 4: Non-Formal 
Financial Development. Prop.5: Financial Sector Formalization. Prop.6: Financial Sector Semi-Formalization. Prop.7: Financial Sector 
Informalization. Prop.8: Financial Sector Non-Formalization. PCR: Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. Mobile:  Mobile 
Phone Penetration. GDPg: GDP growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance.  
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